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Previous literature has tried to establish whether and how steroid hormones are related to
economic risk-taking. In this study, we investigate the relationship between testosterone
(T) and cortisol (C) on one side and attitudes toward risk and ambiguity on the other.
We asked 78 male undergraduate students to complete several tasks and provide two
saliva samples. In the task “Reveal the Bag,” participants expressed their beliefs on
an ambiguous situation in an incentivized framework. In the task “Ellsberg Bags,” we
elicited from the participants through an incentive-compatible mechanism the reservation
prices for a risky bet and an ambiguous bet. We used the difference between the two
prices to calculate each participant’s ambiguity premium. We found that participants’
salivary T and C levels jointly predicted the ambiguity premium. Participants featuring
comparatively lower levels of T and C showed the highest levels of ambiguity aversion.
The beliefs expressed by a subset of participants in the “Reveal the Bag” task rationalize
(in a revealed preference sense) their choices in the “Ellsberg Bags” task.
Keywords: testosterone, cortisol, ambiguity, Ellsberg paradox, dual hormone hypothesis
INTRODUCTION
Many papers study the relationship between hormones and economic risk-taking. Comparatively,
fewer papers in behavioral endocrinology consider the fact that humans face different types of risk,
and that these different types of riskmight have different endocrine correlates. In economics and the
management sciences, however, the distinction between risk proper and uncertainty (or ambiguity)
has been customary ever since Knight (1921) first discussed the difference, followed decades later
by Ellsberg (1961).
In one of Ellsberg’s famous thought experiments, the decision maker can place bets on a black
marble being drawn either from a bag with a known proportion of black and white marbles (the
“risky” bag), or from a bag with unknown proportions (the “ambiguous” or “uncertain” bag). Once
the participant chooses the bag, one marble is drawn. The color of the marble extracted determines
whether the payoff is positive (if a black marble is drawn) or zero. Ellsberg speculated that decision
makers would prefer to bet on the risky bag. He also speculated that this preference would likely
hold regardless of the winning color (black or white), a finding confirmed in human and even in
primate studies (cf. e.g., Hayden et al., 2010). These choices are inconsistent with the rational model
of decision under uncertainty (Savage, 1972) and have given rise to many behavioral models that
try to explain the preference for known-odds gambles (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Klibanoff
et al., 2005; Seo, 2009).
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The participants’ ambiguity premium—the difference between
the price the participants set to sell the bet on the risky bag
minus the price they set for the bet on the ambiguous bag—
provides a discrete measure of the strength of the participants’
preference for known odds. A positive ambiguity premium is
consistent with Ellsberg’s insight that many participants might
prefer known odds. A zero premium is consistent with a decision
maker who does not differentiate between an equiprobable win
or loss and complete lack of information about the chances of
winning or losing. A negative premium implies a preference
for ambiguous decisional situations. The most intuitive way to
understand what kind of information the ambiguity premium
conveys is the participants’ willingness to pay to go frommultiple
possible scenarios about the content of the bag to one possible
scenario only (equal probability of winning or obtaining zero).
Similarly to what has happened for other decisions that
are inconsistent with economic theory, there has been an
increasing effort to identify both the neural and hormonal
correlates of anomalous behavior in risky and ambiguous
situations. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have
found that the representation of the subjective value of the
risky and the ambiguous options seem to take place in
the same area of the brain (the striatum and the medial
prefrontal cortex; cf. Hsu et al., 2005; Levy et al., 2010).
As for the role of hormones, the “dual-hormone hypothesis”
(DHH) proposed that several types of human behaviors are
explained by an interaction between Testosterone (T) and
Cortisol (C). Mehta and Josephs (2010) suggest that status-
seeking behaviors are to be expected among individuals with
simultaneously high T and low C. The DHH seems to account
for a growing number of results from studies on human
aggressiveness, empathy, risk-seeking, status-seeking behavior,
and overbidding in auctions (cf. Mehta and Prasad, 2015;
Pfattheicher, 2017).
The theoretical forerunners of the DHH are the earlier studies
that found that T correlated with aggressive behavior only in
low-C offenders (Dabbs et al., 1991; Popma et al., 2007; Tackett
et al., 2014). Many more papers studied the behavioral correlates
of C only (levels or changes), of T only, or of both T and C,
without controlling for the presence of interaction effects of C
and T. Concerning C, low levels of this hormone were associated
with fearlessness and reduced sensitivity to punishment and
threats (Van Honk et al., 2003). On the other hand, high levels
of C seemed to predict higher anxiety (Brown et al., 1996). T
was found to be positively associated with dominance in social
hierarchies, status-seeking behavior and success in competition
both in animals and humans (the “challenge hypothesis,” cf.
Mazur and Booth, 1998; Oliveira and Oliveira, 2014; Casto and
Edwards, 2016; Wingfield, 2016).
The rationale for studying the endocrine correlates of
economic risk is that risk-taking might have evolved as a way to
increase status (Daly and Wilson, 1997; Ellis et al., 2012). Several
studies have found a positive relation between risk-taking and T
(cf., e.g., Apicella et al., 2008; Sapienza et al., 2009; Zilioli and
Watson, 2012; but cf. the null results in Schipper, 2014; Cueva
et al., 2015). Coates and Herbert (2008) found that traders in
the City of London have significantly higher T levels on days
when they made more than their 1-month daily average. The
authors also found a strong positive correlation between the
traders’ daily C levels and the volatility of their net earnings
on the day of the study. Van Honk et al. (2003) found that
basal C negatively correlates with risky choices. Kandasamy et al.
(2014) found that chronic (i.e., cumulative over several days)
C exposure increased risk aversion. Mehta et al. (2015) found
that basal testosterone is associated with higher financial risk-
taking behaviors, but only for low C subjects, as predicted by the
DHH.
Regarding the endocrine correlates of different types of risk,
to the best of our knowledge T and C have not been addressed
together in the same study. Stanton et al. (2011) found that
neither the risk premium nor the ambiguity premium had
a significant linear relationship with T (the predictor), and
there were instead significant non-linearities in the relationship.
Specifically, individuals that were risk and ambiguity averse
were the ones who presented intermediate levels of T and
individuals neutral to risk and ambiguity were at the two
extremes of the distribution of T. Interestingly, their ambiguity
task measured the participants’ preferences between a situation
of radical uncertainty vs. a situation of complete certainty. Their
measure of the ambiguity premium is therefore not consistent
with Ellsberg’s thought experiment, i.e., a situation of known
odds vs. unknown odds. Buckert et al. (2014) studied the relation
between C, stress and decisions under risk and ambiguity. They
found that after undergoing a stress induction protocol, the
cortisol response did not affect the percentage of choices of the
ambiguous option.
Any conclusion about the sign of the relationship between T
and C and decisions under risk and ambiguity is complicated
by the variety of tasks used in the literature (Schonberg et al.,
2011); the differences between measuring circulating hormones
from saliva, allocating participants to receive T (cf. e.g., Zethraeus
et al., 2009, failing to find any effect of administering T on a
variety of economic tasks) or proxying prenatal T by the 2D:4D
finger ratio (Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011); the sample used
(the role of gender in particular, cf. e.g., Borghans et al., 2009).
We re-examine the relation between T and C and ambiguity
attitudes in Ellsberg’s original framework. We use an incentive
compatible elicitation mechanism to obtain a numeric measure
of the participants’ ambiguity premium. We design a novel task
to elicit the beliefs of the players about an ambiguous situation,
as these beliefs are not directly observable in Ellsberg-type
experiments.
In line with previous behavioral economics research that
links beliefs and choices (cf. e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989),
we expect to find a strong relationship between the beliefs
of the players and their choices in the Ellsberg experiment.
In addition, our design allows us to explore if the result in
the literature concerning the positive association between T
and risk-seeking behavior holds when different types of risks
are involved. No previous study allows us to predict whether
someone characterized by higher T would prefer knowing the
odds and place a higher reservation price for the risky bet or
prefer the ambiguous bet. It is also not clear ex-ante whether an
ambiguity averse individual should exhibit endocrine correlates
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of higher stress, as we would expect based on some previous
studies linking high C to pronounced risk aversion (Kandasamy
et al., 2014; but cf. also Buckert et al., 2014). In our case, the
outcome of both bets is unpredictable, and we lack the risk-free
(degenerate) lottery that is often used to ascertain whether an
individual is risk averse, risk seeking, or risk neutral. On the issue
of the relationship between C and T, and their interaction, and the
ambiguity premium, our analysis by necessity will be exploratory.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Seventy-eight students participated in our experiments after they
responded to a public announcement. The study was reviewed
by the Office of Research Ethics of Simon Fraser University, and
all participants provided written consent before the start of the
experimental procedures. Exclusion criteria for the participation
included (i) eating, drinking liquids other than water, smoking
or brushing teeth in the hour prior to the session; (ii) consuming
alcohol or drugs in the previous 12 h; (iii) intense physical activity
on the day of the experiment; (iv) having a recent history of
smoking more than 5 cigarettes a day, or of taking a medication
that affects hormonal levels; (v) having bleeding gums and an oral
infection. All participants were male undergraduate and graduate
students of Simon Fraser University (mean age = 22.60, SD =
4.44, range = 18–42 years). The participants earned on average
$19 Canadian during the experiment, the sum of their earnings
in all the tasks they performed. Earnings were paid in cash at the
end of the experiment. The entire experiment lasted on average 1
h 30 min.
Procedure
The experiment took place in the afternoon (mean time: 2:30
PM, SD = 1 h 31min). At the beginning of the session,
participants completed a survey about their socio-demographic
features as well as their recent health state. While completing
the questionnaires, participants provided a salivary sample (see
below). Afterward, they were tested in the three economic
tasks explained in details in the next section (“Reveal the Bag”
task or RB, “Ellsberg Bags” task or EB, “Monty Hall” task or
MH). Tasks RB and EB were offered in random order, with
35% of the participants taking the RB task first. The MH task
was always offered last. Instructions for all tasks are provided
in the Supplementary Material (SM) to the article available
online. Tasks RB and EB were implemented without the help of
computers, using bags filled with real marbles. The bags used
were always randomly extracted from a shelf protected by a
curtain visible to the participants, before they made their choices.
This procedure was dictated by the desire to limit “malicious
experimenter effects,” whereby the participant might believe that
the experimenter (or the machine) filled the bags after having
learned of the bets of the participants (cf. e.g., Kadane, 1992;
Kühberger and Perner, 2003; Pulford, 2009). We provided the
instructions of the tasks one at a time, and therefore subjects
could not formulate at the beginning of the experimental session
a strategy for each of the three tasks. To control for order effects
of the tasks, we included a dummy for the order in which the
RB task was offered as a robustness check (see below). Given the
modest amounts of money at stake, we believe it is unlikely, but
cannot ultimately exclude, that the amounts won in a previous
task created an “endowment effect” (Kahneman et al., 1991)
which affected the ensuing choices.
Interspersed with the three economic tasks, participants
completed the BIS/BAS (Carver and White, 1994), Levenson’s
LSRP (Levenson et al., 1995) and Rotter’s Internal-External Locus
of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966) questionnaires. After all tasks
and questionnaires were completed, participants provided a face
picture and a scan of both their hands (not used for the analysis
in this paper). Afterwards, a second salivary sample was collected.
Subjects were then paid their earnings in each of the three tasks.
The exchange rate was communicated in the instructions of each
task (1 experimental point was always worth $0.20 Canadian).
Subjects at this point left the experimental room.
“Reveal the Bag” Task (RB)
We devised this novel task to elicit the beliefs of the players
about an uncertain situation. The experimenter presented to
each participant a bag. Participants were informed that the bag
contained 10 marbles, and each marble could be either white
or black. Participants were asked to guess the bag’s content. The
experimenter randomly picked one bag from the shelf described
above. Bags were replaced behind the curtain at the end of every
participant’s RB task. The extraction of the bag from behind the
curtain was done in front of the participant.
Participants had 10 opportunities (or trials) to guess the
composition of the bag and at the end of the 10th trial, they
received a monetary reward according to the accuracy of their
guesses. Each participant expressed his guesses on a white sheet
that featured a printed grid of 11 columns and 10 rows (a sample
sheet is reproduced in the SM). The rows represented the trials
and the 11 columns represented all the possible scenarios for the
composition of the bag, from all black to all white marbles. On
each trial, the participant could bet on the bag composition by
distributing 11 folder markers (small round stickers) along one
row. When asked for the first time to guess the bag composition
(first trial), the participant had no information regarding the
black/white marbles ratio. After the participant had placed the
11 stickers in the first row, the experimenter started the second
trial by extracting, without replacing, one marble from the bag.
In the second row of the grid, the participant would write
the color that had just been extracted and would express his
new guess, by placing again 11 stickers on the sheet. On each
trial, the experimenter revealed the color of one new marble.
The task ended when the experimenter showed the color of
the 10th marble, which completely revealed the composition of
the bag. The monetary payoff was then calculated by summing
the markers that the participant placed in the column that
corresponded to the actual composition of the bag. In this way,
we tried to ensure that the participants would use the available
information and give some thought to the new information the
experimenter provided about the content of the bag.
This task allows us to elicit, in an incentive-compatible
framework, the beliefs of the subjects regarding an ambiguous
situation that gradually becomes less ambiguous with the
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revelation of the color of the marbles. This task allows us to
test whether the subjects’ choices between the risky bag and the
ambiguous bag in task EB, described next, are influenced by their
beliefs about the contents of the ambiguous bag, as commonly
assumed in behavioral models of ambiguity aversion (cf. e.g.,
Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Klibanoff et al., 2005).
“Ellsberg Bags” Task (EB)
The participants were presented with two bags. The first bag
contained 10 marbles, either white or black, in equal proportions.
The content of this bag was shown to the participants. The second
bag contained 10 marbles, either white or black, but in unknown
proportions. The second bag was randomly chosen from the
same shelf described in the RB task. The second bag was replaced
on the shelf at the end of every participant’s EB task.
Each participant was asked to choose a winning color for the
two bags (white or black). The participant in this game had a
right to extract a marble from each of the bags. If the marble
extracted was of the same color that the participant has chosen,
the participant won 15 experimental points. If the guess was
incorrect, the participant won nothing. In an attempt to elicit the
certainty equivalent for each lottery, the participants were asked
to write two minimum selling prices for their two bets: PA, the
price for the bet on the ambiguous bag, and PR, the price for the
bet on the risky bag. The buyer of each bet was the experimenter,
whose buying price for each bet was determined through a
random physical mechanism (a number between 0 and 15 was
drawn from yet another bag, with replacement). If the buying
price for a bet was higher than, or equal to, the selling price
stated by the participant, the participant pocketed the buying
price, and no extraction took place from the corresponding
bag. If the buying price was lower than the selling price the
participant chose, the extraction of the marble took place. To
ensure that the extraction of the random buying number for
the first bet (the risky one) did not influence choices in the sale
of the second bet, the experimenter’s buying values were given
only after the participant had stated both his prices. Instructions
carefully explained that it was best for subjects to state the true
value of the bets and that the price of the bets should reflect the
desirability of the bets. If the subject thought the bet was very
valuable, meaning that he thought the marble extracted would
be very likely of the same color he chose, he should have stated a
high selling price (close to 15). Conversely, a subject who believed
that the bet was too close to call should have chosen a low price
(close to zero), maximizing the chances that the bet would be
bought by the experimenter at the random buying price. This
elicitation procedure is known in experimental economics as the
BDM method (Becker et al., 1964), and it was first adapted to
the Ellsberg bags, to the best of our knowledge, by Halevy (2007).
Further details on the pros and cons of the BDMmethod applied
to lotteries can be found in Halevy’s paper.
This task allows us not only to know if the participant is prey
to the “Ellsberg paradox,” stating a higher price for the bet on
the risky bag than for the bet on the ambiguous bag, but also to
quantify each subject’s aversion to ambiguity (or preference for
ambiguity, if the price for the risky bag is lower than the price for
the ambiguous bag).
“Monty Hall” Task (MH)
In the MH task participants were presented with three flipped
cups and the experimenter stated that under one of the cups there
was a blackmarble which could be exchanged for 15 experimental
points. Participants were asked to indicate the cup they wanted
to top flip. Next, the experimenter flipped one of the other cups,
always one without any marble under it. The participants were
then offered the possibility to stand by their initial choice of
the cup to flip, or switch. This task is part of a project on the
endocrine correlates of Bayesian updating, a topic wemight study
elsewhere, and with no hypothesized implication for the subjects’
ambiguity attitudes studied here.
Hormonal Assays
Saliva samples were collected using Salimetrics Oral swabs (SOS;
Salimetrics LLC, State College PA) placed under the tongue,
according to vendor usage instructions for T determinations.
According to the vendor, the SOS device consists of “an inert
food-grade polymer” individually validated for use in specific
assays that include salivary T and C determinations. Participants
were instructed to place the oral swab beneath their tongue
for at least 4 min. Samples were chilled immediately following
collection, and then frozen within one h and held at−20◦C until
assay. Samples were assayed at the SFU Neuroendocrinology
laboratory using competitive enzyme immunoassays for T and
C (Salimetrics kits). For both steroids, the average intra-and
inter-assay coefficients of variation were lower than 10%. The
two samples provided by two participants were misplaced, and
three participants were excluded due to them reporting in the
demographics questionnaire that they were using medications
(antibiotics hydrocortisone and medication for acne), leaving
a final sample size of 73 participants. In all the statistical
analyses used in this paper, we average the two measurements
of T and C, to have a better proxy for the level of circulating
hormones around the time of the experiment. Statistical tests
presented in the SM show that differences in each participant’s
two measurements are not statistically significant.
RESULTS
“Reveal the Bag (RB)” Task
In this task, participants expressed their second-order beliefs
regarding the contents of an ambiguous bag (10 marbles, either
white or black). A second-order belief assigns a probability to a
certain scenario for the ambiguous bag (e.g., six black marbles,
four white marbles). We collected information about the second-
order beliefs of the participants as we gradually revealed to them,
marble after marble, the content of the bag.
In an attempt to quantify the dispersion of beliefs about the
content of the bag we computed an 11-bin histogram of all
response possibilities. Afterward, we estimated the normalized
entropy of the individual histograms, according to Shannon’s
formula (Shannon, 1948; Shannon and Weaver, 1949; cf. also
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where pi is the relative frequency at bin i. The normalized
entropy reflects the degree of belief uncertainty regarding the
bag composition. The H scores range from 0—when the second-
order probability mass lies all on one scenario (e.g., six white
and four black), to 1—when all scenarios (from all-black to
all-white) are believed to be equally likely. The mean entropy
(over participants) from trial 1 (the color of zero marbles
has been revealed, complete ambiguity) to trial 10 (only the
color of one marble remains to be revealed) is shown in
Figure 1. The downward trend in the dispersion of beliefs was
clear. Entropy followed a constant rate of decay. To confirm
this finding, we regressed average entropy in each trial on
the trial number, finding a significant negative relation (p <
0.001). About one-quarter of the participants in the first trial
had an entropy of 1, i.e., they thought all the scenarios were
equally likely (the so-called Laplace Principle of Insufficient
Reason, cf. Gilboa, 2009, p. 14). Only 3% of the participants
thought there was only one possible scenario for the bag
(entropy of zero). The remaining cases fell in between (cf.
Figure 1 and the histograms in the SM). In about 8% of the
total number of cases the participants committed a mistake,
by placing positive probability mass on scenarios that were
ruled out by the available information (e.g., attributing positive
probability to the “10 black, 0 white marbles” after one white
marble had already been revealed to them). This provides
evidence that subjects understood the task and considered the
information that was presented to them in order to make their
choices.
“Ellsberg Bags (EB)” Task
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for PR, PA, and the
ambiguity premium (PR-PA).
The reservation prices of the two lotteries were close, which
resulted in an ambiguity premium of small positive magnitude,
consistent with a modest degree of ambiguity aversion in the
sample. The modal choice of premium is zero (31.5% of the
subjects). As in Stahl (2014), we find that ambiguity preferences
are heterogeneous and that a high degree of aversion to ambiguity
might not be the most common finding, as instead the earlier
literature supposed (cf. e.g., Halevy, 2007). Both a paired t-test
and a non-parametricWilcoxon signed-rank test rejected the null
that the average of PR is equal to the average of PA (p-value is in
both cases <0.05). The two prices were very close to the expected
value of the bet on the risky bag, i.e., 7.5 points (regardless of the
color chosen). The fact that PRwas on average above the expected
value of the lottery implies that participants were on average
modestly risk-loving, as in Halevy (2007). When we calculated
the average premium as a percentage (PR−PA)
PA
× 100, the result,
7.5%, was well-below the figure reported in Halevy (2007), i.e.,
20%. Borghans et al. (2009), who also used the BDM design,
reported a percentage figure of around 15%. The proportion
of participants who were ambiguity neutral is comparable to
Halevy’s finding (current study: 30%; Halevy: 22%). PA and PR
were positively correlated (r = 0.61): this implies that typically
participants displayed either a general distaste for seeing the
realization of their random bets (when they chose low prices for
FIGURE 1 | Entropy of beliefs in the RB task.
the two lotteries) or a general taste for seeing the realization of
their bets.
Regression and Interaction Analysis
We used regression analysis to determine whether centered
average T (t̄i − t̄), centered average C (c̄i − c̄) and the interaction
term between the two average centered hormonal measurements
predicted our dependent variable y (the ambiguity premium).
Each t̄i (c̄i) is the average of the participant’s two T (C)
measurements (cf. also the SM for robustness checks using
only the first measurement). The regression model is shown in
Equation 1 (i is the identifier of the participant).
yi = α+γ ([c̄i− c̄])+ δ([t̄i− t̄])+ θ([c̄i− c̄])∗ ([t̄i− t̄])+ εi (1)
The reason for subtracting the mean across participants of the
average hormonal measurements (t̄ and c̄) from each individual’s
average measurement, a procedure known as “centering,” was
that, when using uncentered variables, average C and T were
highly correlated with the T∗C interaction term, creating a
multicollinearity problem. Aiken and West (1991) suggested
centering as a solution to this issue, and the variance inflation
factor for the interaction term went from 48 in the uncentered
model to 1 in the centered model. Table 2 shows the regression
output of regressionmodel (1), estimated throughOrdinary Least
Squares, with robust standard errors (R-squared = 0.063, model
is significant at 5%).
The interaction term between T and C had a significant,
positive relation with the ambiguity premium. Several robustness
checks presented in the SM confirm this finding. We also show
in the SM that the significance of the interaction term in Table 2
can be probably attributed to the strong relation between the two
hormones and PA.
The positive sign of the interaction term, together with the
negative signs of T and C, implied an overall negative relationship
between the two hormone levels and the ambiguity premium. In
Figure 2, we show a contour plot of the predictive margins of
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of the EB task.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PR 73 7.87 2.87 0 15
PA 73 7.27 2.81 0 13
Premium (PR-PA) 73 0.59 2.52 −6.5 8
TABLE 2 | Linear regression predicting the ambiguity premium based on
centered hormones.






FIGURE 2 | Contour plot of the predictive margins of regression
model (1).
the regression model (1). On the axes, we plot T and C about
two standard deviations below and above the (zero) mean. The
color bands show different levels of (predicted) premium. The
Figure shows that a group of participants, specifically those with
comparatively lower levels of T and C, exhibited comparatively
higher aversion to ambiguity. The aversion to ambiguity declined
as T increased, both for the low C and the high C group. The
significance of the interaction term in Table 2 ensures that this
pattern is statistically significant.
Beliefs and Ambiguity Attitudes
We used the responses of the participants in the first trial of
the RB task to analyze the choice of reservation prices for
the lotteries in the EB task. The participants were not given
any signal that the ambiguous bag used in the EB task was
the same as the ambiguous bag in the RB task. Given that,
however, we were in the realm of complete uncertainty, it seems
likely that the participants might have held the same beliefs
regarding the ambiguous bag they faced in the first trial of
the RB task and the ambiguous bag in the EB task. Using a
revealed preference approach, PR would be greater than PA if




was greater than the (Subjective) Expected Utility of





the expected utility calculations for the two lotteries are given in
the SM.
The average across participants of the difference between the
expected utilities of the two lotteries, which we call π (π =
[EU (LR) − SEU (LA)]) is positive (the estimate is π̃ = 0.094).
Together with the finding that the ambiguity premium in the EB
task is on average positive, this finding shows that participants
found on average bets on a risky bag more attractive than bets
on an ambiguous bag. For the participants with entropy equal
to 1 in the first trial of the RB task the expected utility of the
two EB lotteries was the same, and π̃ = 0 was the modal
estimate. Together with the finding that the modal value for
premium is zero, these two results show that neutrality was the
most common attitude to ambiguity in our experiment. We then
carried a direct comparison between each participant’s πi and
his ambiguity premium. These are two different ways to express
the desirability of the bet on the risky bag vs. the bet on the
ambiguous bag. Thirty-two percent of the participants passed this
test of coherency, i.e., the sign of the variable premium is the same
as the sign of π , or they are both zero. Of particular interest is a
group of participants, 16% of the total, who featured a π̃ = 0
and also a premium equal to zero. These participants expressed
their neutrality to ambiguity in a remarkably consistent way. We
found no evidence that hormones played a role in determining
the responsiveness of the choices of the risky lottery to π in a
softmaxmodel like the one used by Frydman et al. (2011). Finally,
we do not find any role of T and C in explaining the degree of
entropy of the participants’ choices in trial 1 of the RB task.
DISCUSSION
We established that there were instances in which the beliefs
of the players translated into choices of one bet vs. the other.
Moreover, we found cases in which subjects had an ambiguity
premium equal to zero and derived, in our armchair calculations
that involved some parameter and functional form choices, the
same expected utility from the two bets (risky and ambiguous).
This congruency is to be expected if the beliefs of the players
about the bags are related to their ambiguity attitudes, as we
hypothesized. Yet this congruency is not assured for most
participants, contrary to our expectations. Possible reasons are
that we used responses from two different tasks in our expected
utility computations, assuming that the beliefs in round 1 of
the RB task were the same as the beliefs about the ambiguous
bag in the EB task, an assumption that might not be valid
for all participants. Another possible explanation is that some
parameter and functional form choices had to be made ex-ante
and we did not build around the expected utility estimates an
interval that allows for perceptualmistakes about the lotteries and
the bags.
We found a significant interaction effect between T and C
and the ambiguity premium in an Ellsberg experiment. The
participants displaying the highest premium were those with
lower C and lower T. These participants showed a preference
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for known odds of winning compared to ignorance about the
odds. This preference attenuated as cortisol and testosterone
jointly increased. This finding supports some aspects of the
DHH. This hypothesis has two parts: one is methodological,
in the sense that it recommends that regression models using
C and T should also control for the interaction effects of the
two hormones, a suggestion we use and which yields some
insights into the endocrine correlates of risk and ambiguity.
The second part of the DHH is substantive, and it posits that
T should positively correlate with status-seeking behavior only
in low C individuals. No consensus exists on the substantive
claim (cf. e.g., Welker et al., 2014, finding that testosterone is
positively related to aggression only for high C individuals), and
we do not find evidence in its favor. The substantive claim of
Mehta and Josephs (2010) is, however, not easily applicable to
our design, given the presence in our study of both risk and
ambiguity. The part of behavioral endocrinology concerned with
economic risk-taking is most likely not impermeable to “garden
of forking paths” issues (Gelman and Loken, 2014), a problem
that might be due to the low number of observations in some
studies, affecting the power of the statistical testing procedures.
We have tried to ease this problem writing pre-analysis plans
(for the beliefs part of the analysis) while acknowledging where
our analysis becomes exploratory due to the novelty of the
study.
Unlike in Stanton et al. (2011), we did not find any evidence
of a non-linear relation between T and the ambiguity premium
(cf. also the robustness checks in the SM and earlier work by
Schipper, 2014). Comparisons between the results of Stanton
et al. (2011) and ours are, however, complicated by the differences
in the design.
T has been associated to outperforming in competitions and to
status-seeking behavior (Zilioli and Watson, 2014). It could play
a role in ambiguous decisions involving monetary gains because
most competition situations are ambiguous, in the sense that
beliefs about the skills and threat posed by the opponent might be
difficult to formulate (cf. Oliveira andOliveira, 2014, on cognitive
appraisal of competitive situations). We would expect therefore
participants with higher levels of T to prefer situations that are
more ambiguous and potentially more rewarding, displaying a
lower premium, as shown in our study. C is the end product of the
hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal stress axis (Dedovic et al., 2009).
Higher C might be related to higher sensitivity to stressors in the
decision context, and therefore it seems sensible that individuals
with high trait T (who preferred ambiguous situations) might
also be characterized by higher levels of C. In the current
study ambiguity only surrounded the probability of winning
(rather than e.g., also the probability of losing, or smaller vs.
greater gains), and a high T individual might have preferred the
ambiguous bag out of confidence that the ambiguous bag offered
higher-probability gains than the risky one. It is left for future
research to establish if T and C are positively correlated with
a preference for ambiguity when ambiguity entails potentially
bigger gains compared to the risky situation. A question we have
not addressed is gender-effects in ambiguity and risk attitudes (cf.
e.g., Borghans et al., 2009; Lighthall et al., 2009; Boksem et al.,
2013; Kandasamy et al., 2014; Schipper, 2014). Future studies
might ask whether our results from amale population extend also
to females.
We contribute new evidence to the behavioral endocrinology
literature, in particular the branch that focuses on choices over
lotteries and their link to T and C. This field has to this date not
converged to a consensus about the significance and direction of
either T or C, or both, for risk-taking behavior, a situation that
invites new studies and replication of existing ones. We hope
future research will also bear in mind Ellsberg (1961)’s remark
that “not all risks are the same” when discussing risk-taking and
its hormonal correlates.
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